We use a simulation model to study how the diversification of electricity generation portfolios influences wholesale prices. We find that technological diversification generally leads to lower market prices but that the relationship is mediated by the supply to demand ratio. In each demand case there is a threshold where pivotal dynamics change. Pivotal dynamics pre-and post-threshold are the cause of non-linearities in the influence of diversification on market prices. The findings are robust to our choice of behavioural parameters and match close-form solutions where those are available. ) and IMD International (Chemin de Bellerive, 23, Lausanne. CH-1006, Switzerland. Tel. (+41) 21 618 0716. E-mail: augusto.ruperezmicola@imd.ch). Web: http://www.ruperezmicola.net 1 1 British Energy has recently started to operate one coal-fired plant. 2 Papers which also use the Roth and Erev method in the electricity context include Nicolaisen et al. (2001), Rupérez Micola and Bunn (forthcoming) and Rupérez Micola et al. (forthcoming).
Introduction
Electricity is a non-storable, undifferentiated commodity, delivered into a market with low demand elasticity, high security of supply requirements and wide seasonal variations. As a result, the industry accommodates a wide range of generating technologies, and firms own not one but several plants. Some generators are technologically diversified and own nuclear plants on the base-load as well as high-cost thermal units. For example PG & E, a large US utility, owns hydro, nuclear, thermal and renewable plants (PG & E Corporation, 2006) . Others are specialists, focusing on only one technology. Until recently, British Energy's generation portfolio was formed exclusively by eight nuclear generating units (British Energy, 2006) . 1 The effect of technological diversification on prices is an important question in industries with undifferentiated output but different production technologies. A market in which generators are specialised could exhibit more market power because the price-setting part of the merit order is more concentrated. However, in electricity pools, specialised high-cost generators have less incentives to exert market power because they lack base-load plants to reap the benefits. In contrast, diversified firms have incentives to use their high-cost plants to increase market prices and thereby increase the profit on the base-load, but may not have enough price-setting capacity to do so.
In this paper, we address the general questions of "what is the shape of the diversification to prices relationship?" and "what are its determinants?". Specifically, we study different markets where a generation duopoly own varying amounts of base-and peak-load capacity that is bundled into a high-and a low-cost plant. In order to isolate the portfolio effects, we keep market concentration constant, as well as the market base-load and high-cost capacities. Our trading environment is a multi-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auction. This set-up, however, is often characterised by the presence of a manifold of non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993). To achieve predictions, we use an inductive selection method based on the adaptive theory of reinforcement learning put forward by Roth and Erev (1995) . 2 Our main policy findings are that more diversification often leads to lower market prices. This relationship, however, is non-monotonic and mediated by the market excess capacity. For each demand to supply ratio, we identify a diversification breaking point, estimated from the simulations, where dynamics change. Up to the breaking point, more intense competition due to higher diversification always leads to lower prices. In low-demand situations, prices drop further after the breaking point. In high-demand cases, instead, further diversification leads to higher prices, but prices remain lower or equal to those under perfect specialisation.
We show that the non-monotonic diversification/prices relationship is caused by regime changes in the firms' incentives and market power. Interestingly, the estimated breaking points are shown to (statistically) match the theoretically predicted thresholds at which the number of "pivotal" plants change. 3 In our setup, there is always one and only one pivotal plant under little or no diversification. After the threshold, the number of pivotal plants changes. In low demand situations, the market moves from one to no pivotal plants, which results in further competitive pressures. In high demand cases, there are two peak-load pivotal plants post-threshold, which leads to some implicit coordination and higher prices.
In spite of its importance, the literature on generation portfolios as a source of market power is relatively sparse. Arellano and Serra (2005) show how, in cases where a regulator uses peakload marginal costs to determine wholesale prices, generators can exercise market power by increasing the share of peak technology in their portfolio. They conclude that market power in this context should not be measured by the traditional price-cost margin or concentration measures, but by the distortion in the composition of the generating portfolio due to regulatory incentives. Bushnell (2003) uses a Cournot model to analyse competition among several firms when each possesses some hydroelectric and thermal generation resources. He concludes that firms may find it profitable to allocate more hydro production to off-peak periods than they would under perfect competition, or if they did not act strategically. Garcia et al. (2005) analyse the price-formation process in an infinite-horizon model where hydroelectric generators engage in dynamic price-based competition and show how simulations with a basic learning algorithm converge to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Bunn and Oliveira (2007) also use a simulation to model the interaction between an electricity market and a plant swapping game.
They identify a symbiotic interaction between the two markets: initial situations where firms are perfectly diversified evolve, via plant trading, into lower electricity prices than those in which firms were originally specialised.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Part 2, we describe the model and simulation procedure. The results are presented in Part 3 and we conclude with a short discussion in Part 4.
Model and Simulation Procedure

Market structure
Our model incorporates key features of electricity markets in the short run. Two companies that compete for the supply of the market own a mix of low (e.g. nuclear) and high (e.g. thermal) marginal cost capacity. 4 Denoting the generating companies as 1 and 2 and the overall market capacity as K, the capacities of their respective low (l) and high (h) cost plants are
where α ∈]0, 0.5[ represents the degree of portfolio diversification. In the case of specialisation (α = 0), company 1 is a low-cost specialist and company 2 is specialised in the high-cost technology. Portfolio diversification grows with α, a growing proportion of the base-load generator's capacity is exogeneously replaced with high-cost units. Symmetrically, the generator's high-cost capacity is replaced with base-load. In the case of full diversification (α = 0.5), each company holds the same amount of low-and high-cost generating capacity. This formulation isolates the effects of portfolio diversification because, while allowing for different degrees of diversification, the total capacity of each company is kept constant,
as are the market aggregates of low-and high-cost capacities,
Marginal costs are assumed to be constant; normalised to 0 for the low-cost plants and equal to c for the high-cost plants, and there are no grid constraints. 5 Although relevant in the long term, we do not deal with entry and exit of firms, capacity expansion, the use of long-term contracts (as in e.g. Baldick et al., 2006) , ancillary and capacity payments. 4 The model could be easily extended to other more realistic market configurations, including all sorts of oligopolies and the existence of a competitive fringe. However, our analysis in a stylised market is more transparent and comparable to previous literature. 5 The addition of network constraints would undoubtedly make the analysis richer but it would also make it more complicated to dissentangle effects due exclusively to technology diversification from those arising from local market power exerted by relatively small players.
Market rules
Trading takes place through a multi-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auction. Suppliers submit simultaneous single-price bids at which they are willing to sell up to the capacity of each plant.
Each firm, thus, submits a piecewise "step" supply function. 6 Possible bids are bounded between marginal costs and Ψ, with Ψ being the maximum "reasonable" price. 7 We model the market demand Q as fully inelastic, 8 drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval [Q − ε,Q + ε], whereQ is its expected value and ε accounts for the small uncertainty typical in day-ahead forecasting. 9 We assume that there is always some system overcapacity, Q + ε < K, but demand always exceeds the market aggregate of low-cost capacity,Q − ε > K/2, consistent with the normal operations of many de-regulated energy markets. 10 An independent auctioneer determines the uniform market price P by intersecting the ad hoc supply function with the realised demand. She assigns full capacity, q j i = k j i , to the M plants with bids below the market price; the remaining capacity, q j i = Q − P {i,j}∈M k j i , to the plant with a bid equal to the market price; 11 and zero sales, q j i = 0, to those bidding above the market price. Profits for each company are
Multiple equilibria and inductive selection
This trading setting often presents a manifold of non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993; Crawford et al., 2006) . For example, if there is full diversification, having one generator bidding the maximum price for the high-cost unit, while the other generator bids at marginal cost, is part of an equilibrium if demand is relatively high.
Proposition 1 Assume that generators are diversified (α = 0.5) and the expected demand is high,Q > 3/4. Then, there is a manifold of non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria. 6 Piecewise supply functions have been introduced, among others, by Hobbs and Pang (2007) . 7 This upper price ceiling can be understood as a limit triggering regulatory intervention or the cost of alternative, expensive, load fuels to which the system administrator could switch at short notice if prices exceed Ψ. It also reflects high cost back-up power generation facilities owned by many industrial users. 8 The literature has established the extremely low price elasticity of short-term electricity demand, originating, among others, from the lack of real-time metering systems (e.g. Stoft, 2002) . 9 The small uncertainty is introduced for the sake of realism, but its absence would not alter our findings. 10 For example, the UK energy system includes a reserve margin of about 20% of expected peak demand. 11 In case of a tie, the selling plant is selected randomly.
Proof. Since the two firms are symmetric, denote the price-setting firm as Firm 1. We are going
The strategy of Firm 2 is clearly a best response to the strategy of Firm 1 because both quantity and market price are the maximum possible.
Then, by setting b l 1 = 0, Firm 1 has no influence in the payoffs. Finally, setting b h 1 = Ψ is a best response as long as
One can easily check that c < b b < Ψ.
Standard comparative statics analyses rely on the Nash specification to determine the solution. Hence, multiple equilibria make it difficult to come up with an answer to our research question, which should be based on a comparative statics exercise with respect to the degree of diversification.
In equilibrium multiplicity cases, a selection method is necessary to choose amongst them.
In broad terms, there are two schools of thought in the area of equilibrium selection (Haruvy and Stahl, 2004 They are based on the law of effect, whereby actions that result in positive consequences are more likely to be repeated in the future while those that result in negative consequences are less likely to be replayed. One of the main strengths of reinforcement models is that one does not need to make assumptions on the information that players have about strategies, history of play and payoff structure of the other players. This is especially useful to model very volatile markets such as wholesale electricity.
Behavioural learning
In order to model learning, we adopt in particular the well-known and practical-to-implement reinforcement learning method put forward by Roth and Erev (1995) -denoted as R-E. The previously described bidding competition is repeated for a finite number of periods. Behavioural learning takes place by repeating the following three steps in each period. 
Each bid is generated by an "action s". Bids generated from lower actions are more competitive,
i.e. closer to marginal costs.
In each round t, each generator i selects an action s for plant j with a likelihood or "propensity" r j i,s (t). The probability of an action being played is given by its propensity divided by the sum of the propensities of all possible actions,
Propensities for all actions are initialised to the plants' maximum per-period profit, i.e. r j i,s (1) = Ψk j i , so that all actions have the same initial probability, p j i,s (1) = 1 S for all s, i and j. STEP 2: The auctioneer determines the market price by intersecting the ad hoc supply function with the realised demand.
As explained above, the auctioneer determines the price and the individual quantities by intersecting the ad hoc supply function with the realised demand, which is assumed to be independently distributed across periods. Subsequently, the price and the individual quantities are communicated independently to each generator. 12 An alternative is to allow expensive plants to bid below c so that they have to find out for themselves that this is not profitable. This slows the learning process down but does not alter our results. Thus, as most of the electricity simulation literature, we do not allow firms to bid below marginal costs. At the end of each round, plants reinforce the selected action, a, through an increase in its propensity that is equivalent to the performance of the company as a whole, π i (t). Actions that are similar, i.e. a − 1 and a +1, are also reinforced but to a lesser extent, precisely by
where 0 < δ < 1 ("persistent local experimentation" in the terminology of R-E). All propensities are discounted by γ ("gradual forgetting") and actions whose probability falls below a certain threshold are removed from the space of choice ("extinction in finite time"). The pre-extinction propensities for the following period r j0 i,s (t + 1) are
and the final propensities, corrected by the extinction feature, are
where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition between brackets is satisfied and zero otherwise.
These three steps are repeated for a finite number of periods T . Although generators refine their strategies through learning, there always remains some degree of uncertainty. We therefore perform many simulation runs and we define convergence in terms of the across-run average standard deviation of prices. We require the finite number of periods T to be such that the initial average standard deviation is reduced below a given threshold. Our simulations produce a large dataset, which is described in the following subsection, and analysed econometrically in the subsequent section.
Simulation parameters and dataset
The end-user reasonable price ceiling is set at Ψ = 200, with a discrete grid of S = 100 possible prices. Total capacity is set to K = 300, so that each generator's capacity is K/2 = 150.
Marginal costs for the high-cost plants are c = 100 and zero for the low-cost plants.
We perform simulations for a discrete grid of fourteen expected demand cases,Q = {160, For each specification, we have performed fifty simulation runs. We consider that convergence is attained if the average standard deviation is reduced by 1/4. This occurs around period 200.
We allow each simulation to run for 500 periods. 13 We then build a dataset consisting of average prices for the last 200 periods (301 to 500), for each simulation run, α,Q, γ and δ. 14 As a robustness check, we have run additional simulations forQ = 100 andQ = 300 (for various specifications of the other parameters), where von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) price predictions would be unique and equal to 0 and 200, respectively. Simulated prices evolve in the direction of their prediction and the 95% confidence intervals of observed prices include in both cases the predicted prices. 15 3 Results Table 1 summarises the relationship between α and stationary market prices, withQ as a covariate, and fixed effects for δ and γ. The results show a positive relationship between demand and prices, as expected. The relationship between the diversification parameter, α, and market prices is negative and strongly significative. Diversification leads to lower market prices. The inclusion of fixed effects suggests that, overall, the results are robust to the R-E parameter specifications. 16 13 For each specification, the one-lag with trend Augmented Dickey-Fuller test-statistic for the price series is lower than -10. Given that the 95% critical value is -3.43, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is always rejected. 14 Increasing substantially the length of the simulation, e.g. to 1, 000 periods and using the averages between 801 and 1, 000, did not change the nature of our results. 15 Figures are available upon request from the authors. 16 Taken together, Table 1 and Figures 1 to 3 suggest that the shape of the portfolio diversification to market prices relationship is generally decreasing, with two caveats. First, the relationship is not monotonic and second, there is a significant variation in its shape, depending onQ. Structural breaks occur for α = 0.40 forQ = 240, between α = 0.17 and α = 0.23 for Q = 180 and α = 0.14 forQ = 280. We hence obtain three preliminary stylised facts regarding the diversification to prices relationship:
Diversification/prices relationship
1. Diversification leads to lower prices in general;
2. The market demand influences both absolute price levels and the shape of the diversification to prices relationship;
3. The diversification to prices relationship is not monotonic but seems to present structural stability breaks.
In the remainder of the paper, we further explore those findings. We first show that the diversification/prices relationship presents non-linearities in all demand cases.
Structural breaking points and market prices
For each demand and R-E combination, we estimate a simple piecewise linear model between the level of diversification and the prices, using dummy variables. The model is uniquely specified by the choice of some threshold value α v ,
where D i = 0 if α i < α v , and D i = 1 when α i ≥ α v . That is, pre-and post-breaking point regression estimates are specified, respectively, by
The simulated breaking point is then defined as the threshold value that generates the best-fit regression.
where F (α v ) denotes the F-statistic obtained from a piecewise linear regression with threshold α v . 
Pivotal regime switching point: theory and simulation
In this section, we explore further the non-linearities. We show that the simulated structural Notice that the theoretical pivotal switching points forQ = 240,Q = 180 andQ = 280 are visually close to the structural regime change thresholds in the diversification/prices relationships of Figures 1 to 3 . We now need to derive confidence intervals for the estimated values to formally compare the theoretical and the estimated breaking points. We approximate the distribution of the structural breaks through a bootstrap procedure. For each demand (fourteen cases) and
R-E (nine) assumptions, we extract 99 random subsamples of 1, 020 observations stratified for α (we use twenty observations for each α out of the fifty available). We use Definition 2 to obtain the sub-samples' structural breaking points.
In Figure 5 , we represent the mean (squares) and the 95% confidence intervals of the structural breaking points. Also in the same figure, we present the theoretical switching points (diamonds), as described in Table 2 . Each panel corresponds to one R-E combination and for each panel we represent the simulated and theoretical breaking points (vertical axis) for each level of demand (horizontal axis). Theoretical thresholds and simulation breaking points comove following an inverted-V shape: they increase when the change is from one to zero pivotal players, and decrease when we move from one to two pivotal players. Confidence intervals are narrow in general. 17 Overall, the fit between the close-form and (endogenously obtained) simulated results is very good. Out of 126 comparisons, only 3 theoretical switching points fall outside the confidence intervals and 123 fall inside. That leads us to the following stylised fact:
11. There is strong correspondence between simulated breaking points and analytically derived switching points.
Diversification and latent intensity of competition
In the simulation environment it is possible to inspect the probability priors from which bids are chosen. It is therefore possible to study how market structures (excess demand, generation diversification, etc.) influence the firms' "competitive attitude" and not only market outcomes. 18 17 Breaking points are more difficult to identify forQ = 230,Q = 240, andQ = 290. That might, in part, be due to the location of the corresponding αt in the extremes. ForQ = 230 andQ = 240 one has αt = 0.47, which in the estimation would correspond to a linear model for all observations in α < 0.47 and a second regime for only α = {.48, .49}. Similarly, forQ = 290 we have α t = 0.07, and there is one regime for α < 0.7 and another for α ≥ 0.7. The flexibility in the two-regime model is thus less present in those cases. 18 We have also analysed latent competition intensities in Rupérez Micola and Bunn (forthcoming) and Rupérez Through their trading interaction and the R-E algorithm, firms learn to prioritise those bidding strategies that achieve higher payoffs and choose them more often. Price regularities follow once marginal supply patterns are established.
The panels in Figure 6 The curves summarise end-of-simulation cumulative bidding probabilities underQ = 180, andQ = 280 for specialisation (α = 0), diversification (α = 0.5) and at the breaking points (α t = 0.20 and α t = 0.13, respectively, see Table 2 ), averaged across the 50 simulation runs for δ = 0.5 and γ = 0.005. Thus, there is a clear identification between generation technology and the competitiveness of the plant's trading prior.
Moreover, we find evidence suggesting a link between portfolio diversification, learning, trading behaviour and market outcomes. For a given α, a demand increase fromQ = 180 toQ = 280
has the effect of making the bids less competitive (i.e. lower right movements). Moreover, trading priors shift in the competitive direction (upper left) when diversification grows from α = 0 to α t with resulting lower bids and, hence, market prices. However, when the movement is from α t to α = 0.5, the curves move to the lower-right corner, which suggests a less competitive attitude, with resulting higher prices. 
Plant size and diversification
Discussion
We study the relationship between the degree of diversification in electricity generation portfolios and the firms' ability and incentives to influence prices. The setting, a version of von der Fehr and
Harbord's (1993) electricity market, describes some aspects of energy trading well but includes a very large number of non-Pareto ranked pure strategy equilibria. Thus, computational learning algorithms offer a number of conceptual and practical advantages for economic analysis. We choose the R-E inductive equilibrium selection algorithm and, rather than focusing on pure specialisation and diversification, we also analyse a wide range of intermediate combinations.
Our main research question concerns the shape of the diversification versus market price relationship. The simulations suggest that this is often decreasing, but that demand levels influence both its shape and the price levels. The relationship is not monotonic but it includes structural stability breaks. For a wide range of parameters, we have also identified a strong correspondence between close-form switching points and those endogenously obtained in the simulations.
It is well-known that a market where generators are specialised can exhibit more market power because its price-setting players are more concentrated. However, specialised high cost generators have less incentive to exert market power because they lack base-load plants. In con- 
